

Protecting PQC Algorithms against Physical Attacks



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## Why PQC Is Urgent


- All today's asymmetric cryptography algorithms are vulnerable to quantum computer attacks, regardless of the key size.
- "Harvest-now, decrypt-later" is happening.
- NSA (CNSA 2.0), BSI, and ANSSI mandate migration:
  - Deprecation in 2030
  - Disallowance in 2035
- Long-life systems: vehicles, satellites, industrial IoT, etc. must adopt PQC today.






## **Ideal World – Black Boxes, Perfect Security**

## (for PQC Algorithms – Including Quantum Adversaries)









Digital Signing and Verification (e.g., ML-DSA)



## Real World – Grey Boxes, Side-Channel Leakages




Secure Key Establishment (e.g., ML-KEM)



Digital Signing and Verification (e.g., ML-DSA)




## **Unprotected Kyber Decapsulation**





## **Kyber Decapsulation Protected Using Shares**



- No protection of the compression in decaps and decompression in encaps
- The suggested protections (the Fisher-Yates randomization) have been successfully attacked
- Very significant performance degradation, especially in SW implementations




## Attacks on Unprotected Implementations and Protected Implementations Using Shares

- <u>Side-Channel and Fault Attacks on ML-KEM and ML-DSA</u> an introduction into ML-KEM and ML-PQC, countermeasures, and 6 side-channel attacks, 2 of them on protected implementations
- A Chosen-Ciphertext Side-Channel Attack on Shuffled CRYSTALS-Kyber an attack on protected (shuffled) ML-KEM
- <u>Secret Key Recovery Attacks on Masked and Shuffled Implementations of</u>
  <u>CRYSTALS-Kyber and Saber</u> an attack on protected (masked and shuffled)
  <u>ML-KEM</u>
- ... and many others



## FortifyIQ – Kyber Decapsulation Protected Using "Inflation" (patent pending)


### You do not need to choose between secure, fast and compact anymore!



- Any pair or triplet of bits contains only a negligible information
- Decompression and inflation are merged where necessary, and so are deflation and compression
- **Excellent PPA:** 
  - In HW: Tradeoff between matching or exceeding the performance of a naïve implementation and minimizing the area
  - In SW (compared to a naïve implementation):
    - Significantly smaller data RAM size
    - The same code size
    - Performance on par



## FortifyIQ's CryptoBox





#### **IP Cores**

#### **FortiCrypt**

**AES XP** 

Ultra High Bandwidth **IP Core** 

**AES ULP** 

**Ultra Low Power IP Core**  **AES SX** 

**Balanced IP Core** 

**AES UC** 

**HMAC** 

**Ultra Compact** IP Core

#### FortiMac

HMAC SHA2-XP

SHA2 High-Performance IP Core IP Core

#### **FortiPKA**

**FortiPKA** 

**Public Key Accelerator** 

**FortiPKEx Public-Private Keys Exchanger** 

FortiPKA+PQC\*

**Hybrid PKA and PQC Accelerator** 

#### **FortiPQC**

ML-KEM (Kyber)\*

ML-DSA (Dilithium)\*

\*fully customized solution



#### Eliminate DPA&FIA Vulnerabilities



#### **Cryptographic Toolboxes**





#### FortiCryptoBOX-UC

Ultra Compact Package of PKA, AES, and HMAC Accelerators

**FortiCrypt** 

FortiMac

**FortiPKA** 

FortiPQC

#### FortiCryptoBOX-XP

**Ultra High-Performance Package of PKA, AES and HMAC Accelerators** 

#### FortiCryptoBOX-PQC

**Ultra Compact Package of** PKA+PQC. AES. and HMAC **Accelerators** 

#### FortiEDA

**Pre-Silicon Security Verification** 














#### **Roots of Trust**





**FortiAES** 

**FortiMac** 


FortiECC/RSA

FortiML-KEM





## TVLA Assessment of FortiPQC Library Kyber (ML-KEM) Using FortiEDA








# Thank you!

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